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1. Introduction 
At the moment, there is widespread and despairing 
astonishment at the effectiveness of ISIS in exploiting 
the information space, particularly in its capacity to use 
social media for purposes of recruitment.1 These 
achievements, as sordid as they may be, give rise to 
self-examination among those long established as en-
gaged in shifting or sustaining public opinion. The rise 
of ISIS and its impact on media ecology can be ana-
lyzed, in part, as a case of asymmetric information war-
fare. In this essay, I wish to do three things with ISIS as 
an object of interest: articulate the relation between 
asymmetric warfare and asymmetric information war-
fare; examine the particular challenge of the ISIS tech-
niques to traditional players, especially international 
broadcasters; and, finally, discuss responses to the 
phenomenon. This is a study, too, of how innovation 
can catch, unawares, the established, the conventional, 
                                                          
1 There are hundreds of articles on the subject. Compare 
Mark Mazzetti and Michael Gordon (2015) with Kathy Gilsi-
nan (2015). 
namely entities that assume that the privileges of pre-
vious power will continue. Examples abound of the 
changing dynamics of information flow in a world of 
new media technologies and practices. In the very early 
days of the Syrian conflict, the New York Times report-
ed how a dozen or two diasporic geeks were successful 
in capturing and shaping the way the narrative of the 
Syrian protests was being received in Western capitals. 
Syria could not control the narrative. Western broad-
casters could not. And certainly the international 
broadcasters were unable to as well. For Joshua Landis, 
a professor of Middle East studies at the University of 
Oklahoma, this led to an interesting, not necessarily 
exaggerated, conclusion: “These activists have com-
pletely flipped the balance of power on the regime, 
and that's all due to social media” (Price, 2014). 
True, these young Syrian activists were early dis-
rupters (and supporters of freedom of expression), but 
they fade into the shadows compared to the later ca-
pacity of ISIS to turn prior assumptions on their heads. 
And the Syrian dissenters ultimately relied on the meg-
aphones of great conventional broadcasters and news-
papers to get their word out. They are, however, ex-
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amples of sudden transformations and new concepts 
of capturing media for modes of change that require 
analysis: a perceived reversal of an existing distribution 
of power in the information sphere. States seek to de-
termine aspects of a new epidemiology. They and ISIS 
are examples of a context in which the state had over-
arching control over how words and images, even 
thoughts and ideas, were diffused, it now frequently 
finds itself backfooted, even stutteringly impotent.  
2. Asymmetric Information Conflicts 
Asymmetry in the sense I use it here has its source and 
origin in the concept of “asymmetrical warfare,” a con-
cept that has its own vagaries. One definition from the 
force-related context calls asymmetrical these conflicts 
where one opponent can take actions that are not 
available to its foe (Barnett, 2003). This is an asym-
metry in the quiver of techniques, where the unavaila-
bility may stem from legal, ethical and pragmatic rea-
sons: historic differences in access to information, 
differences in access to and control of the means of 
distribution and differences in the capacity to create 
and produce messages. In contemporary usage, war-
fare asymmetry often describes the circumstances 
where a conventionally powerful state is faced with a 
ragtag set of protestors or adversaries who are, at the 
outset, hardly worth dignifying as enemies. A final def-
inition of warfare asymmetry is functional: it describes 
techniques that an adversary exercises to “undermine 
an opponent’s strengths while exploiting his weak-
nesses using methods that differ significantly from the 
opponent’s usual mode of operations” (Miles, 1999).  
In recent decades, we have associated asymmet-
rical warfare with acts of terrorism, tactics like hostage 
taking, the use of biological warfare and the use of tor-
ture. Asymmetric warfare is contrasted with a conven-
tional “ideal,” one where sides are evenly matched, use 
similar kinds of techniques, and where over centuries, 
rules (whether fully respected or not) have developed 
regarding the limits on what one side can do to the 
other. To put it simply, asymmetry in warfare occurs 
when parties to conflict seem mismatched in particular 
ways—with one combatant far stronger in terms of 
firepower and wealth than the other, or where the 
strategies of one combatant are radically different 
from the strategies of the other and from the norm.  
The notion here is to ask what the concept of 
asymmetric warfare has to offer us, if anything, in 
terms of strategic insight into current modes of infor-
mation conflict.2 Like asymmetry in war, asymmetry in 
the battle for loyalties involves undermining an ene-
my’s strengths and exploiting its weaknesses. Gains are 
                                                          
2 For insight into the general concept, see U.S. Army/Marine 
Corps Counterinsurgency Manual. A thorough explanation is 
contained in McCauley and Moskalenko (2010).  
achieved through the pioneering use of techniques not 
immediately available to the other side—either be-
cause it has not discovered them, has not mastered 
them or is otherwise disdainful of their adoption. 
Asymmetry in communications techniques often in-
volves significant disruption of the status quo, initiated 
by entities that are often scorned as disempowered or 
substantially weaker (Srebreny & Mohammadi, 1994). 
Underestimation is a characteristic byproduct of 
asymmetry. The lack of conventional equality masks 
the resourcefulness of desperation.  
3. Asymmetric Entrants in a Market for Loyalties 
I start with an approach I developed over the years, 
first in an article in the Yale Law Journal, then in an ear-
lier book, Television, the Public Sphere, and National 
Identity (Monroe, 1995), in Media and Sovereignty, and 
finally in Free Expression, Globalism and the New Stra-
tegic Communication. In these works I sought to define 
a “market for loyalties,” in which large-scale competi-
tors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, use the reg-
ulation of communications to organize a cartel of im-
agery and identity among themselves.  
“The ‘sellers’ in this market are all those for whom 
myths and dreams and history can somehow be 
converted into power and wealth—classically 
states, governments, interest groups, businesses, 
and others. The ‘buyers’ are the citizens, subjects, 
nationals, consumers—recipients of the packages 
of information, propaganda, advertisements, dra-
ma, and news propounded by the media. The con-
sumer ‘pays’ for one set of identities or another in 
several ways that, together, we call ‘loyalty’ or ‘citi-
zenship.’ Payment, however, is not expressed in the 
ordinary coin of the realm: It includes not only 
compliance with tax obligations, but also obedience 
to laws, readiness to fight in the armed services, or 
even continued residence within the country. The 
buyer also pays with his or her own sense of identi-
ty.” (Monroe, 1994)  
Government I argued, is usually the mechanism that al-
lows the cartel to operate and is often part of the car-
tel itself. But among the many points that are intriguing 
is this: what we mean by “government,” or what levers 
of power should be included, changes and means dif-
ferent things in different contexts. Indeed, it is hardly 
ever a single government that makes these decisions. 
What I emphasize is the way in which the market for 
loyalties within any state or in a different definition of 
target audience is often the product of multiple inter-
ests—other states, transnational religious entities, 
NGOs, and others. Some of these are members of the 
cartel, formally or not. And it is difficult to determine 
which players are most effective in the cartel: the state 
 Media and Communication, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 46-54 48 
agencies, the multinational corporations, religious 
groups, international organizations, governmental and 
non-governmental. Some cartels are stable—having 
the same members with the same relevant strengths, 
for years; some are unstable, ever changing, with vary-
ing capacities to police participant behavior and the 
entry of competitors.  
Those who seek to enter the market, particularly 
those who are for many reasons forcefully excluded 
are the asymmetric pioneers. This is hardly always the 
case, but in the instance of ISIS, asymmetries of antici-
pated exclusion were met with affirmative invention. 
Asymmetry prodded creativity; but asymmetry may al-
so have provided time and cover for efforts to take 
hold and experimentation to go below the radar. ISIS 
did not spring forth full blown, but much had been put 
in place in terms of communications strategy when it 
came to major public attention.  
Markets for loyalties are, by definition, ubiquitous 
and have existed at all times in their wide variety of 
forms. We like to think that the current environment is 
different, in terms of how these markets function: the 
opening impact of technology, the range of partici-
pants, the sophistication of players, the porousness of 
boundaries, and the changing power of regulatory bod-
ies in terms of establishing and enforcing rules for par-
ticipation and exclusion. All these factors have always 
been present; it is in terms of their relative importance 
that markets change over time. 
In terms of this “market for loyalties” analysis, the 
successful surmounting of asymmetrical weaknesses 
can be said to occur when a group, excluded from the 
cartel of entrants eligible to shape national identity (or 
other similar constructs), breaks through and uses the 
breakthrough to substantially change the distribution 
of allegiances in a target audience. Asymmetry can be a 
function of technology, or profound differences, as 
mentioned, in what tools and approaches are consid-
ered available. Beheadings and the showing of behead-
ings—as a mode of expression—is an example of ethi-
cal availability: it can be a mode so repugnant that it is 
prized by some and abhorred by others. Asymmetry 
becomes a guide to how rude entrants use technology 
or force or subsidy or other mechanisms to break into 
cartels.  
4. International Broadcasting and the Market for 
Loyalties 
The history of international broadcasting—here princi-
pally meaning state-sponsored broadcasters reaching 
across borders—could be written from the perspective 
of asymmetry. These broadcasters, including the BBC 
World Service and aspects of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors in the US, could see themselves as once his-
toric innovators—entering tightly closed ideological 
markets to bring in new voices, new approaches. Inter-
national broadcasters were short-wave innovators, 
technical pioneers, adventurers with new satellite 
technologies. They emerged often from colonial com-
municators to their own diaspora, or local bureaucra-
cies to redefine themselves as instruments of potential 
political change. They thought about how to give voice 
to those without any and to project credible news ac-
count. How “white,” “grey” or clandestine they or their 
colleagues were might be a gauge to the asymmetry of 
their condition. 
There are still innovators among the international 
broadcasters, but they are extensively challenged by the 
asymmetric entrants, principally, at the moment, ISIS.  
In Iran, the mullahs may think of international 
broadcasters from the West as powerful interlopers, 
while the international broadcasters themselves may 
self-perceive as struggling to break through in a diffi-
cult environment. To put it another way, the interna-
tional broadcasters, for the most part, are elements of 
what is delicately called the “legacy media,” a category 
of entities that have felt power and privilege, that 
crested in their corporate life–cycle, and where the 
question of future and future role looms large. This po-
sition means that asymmetry takes a different profile. 
International broadcasters are in a culture of extending 
existing arrangements, when they prod they can be 
painted not as the creative, brave outsider, but rather 
as an instrument of a hegemonic West. 
International broadcasters conform to this model 
because of their measured performances and expecta-
tions. While the practitioners sometimes make large 
claims as to the potential for regime change and histor-
ic effectiveness in “bringing down the Wall,” tolerance 
of these entities as contributors to discourse can be of-
ten attributed to some idea of limit either on their 
goals or their impact. Censorship, filtering, other 
modes of aggressive behavior are indications that the 
international broadcaster is crossing some vague line 
of accepted behavior. In the US, under this analysis, the 
international broadcasters may have to assert some 
goals to satisfy their donors—primarily the US Con-
gress—realizing that in practice they must behave, in 
large part, under cartel rules.  
A decade ago, before ISIS, before the Arab Spring, 
The challenge of understanding and appreciating 
asymmetries in the battles for hearts and minds was 
highlighted for me by a now somewhat–forgotten 2006 
speech given by Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of 
Defense, to the Council on Foreign Relations in New 
York. The talk, labeled “New Realities in a Media Age,” 
was a candid discussion by a person of immense power 
who was perplexed by what seemed to be the sudden 
and unexpected diminution of that power (Rumsfeld, 
2006). The premise of the talk was that “Our enemies 
have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today’s media 
age, but for the most part we, our country, our gov-
ernment, have not adapted.” For Rumsfeld, this asym-
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metry of adaptation meant that “violent extremists” 
had gained an edge in “manipulating the opinion elites 
of the world.” In addition, “They plan and design their 
headline–grabbing attacks using every means of com-
munication to intimidate and break the collective will 
of free people.” These individuals were not bound, 
Rumsfeld argued, by the standards of legality and eth-
ics that bound the United States. But Rumsfeld also 
recognized that this was not just a question of tactics 
or purpose, but one, in part, of superior practical appli-
cation. “They’re able to act quickly. They have relative-
ly few people. They have modest resources compared 
to the vast and expensive bureaucracies of Western 
governments.” In spite of these qualities, or perhaps 
because of them, these groups had, in Rumsfeld’s view, 
prevailed in the media sphere. Rumsfeld summarized 
this asymmetry with a metaphor that demonstrates 
the irony and tragedy of power—the turn from 
strength to weakness, from dominance to something 
closer to cluelessness: “Our federal government is real-
ly only beginning to adapt our operations to the 21st 
century. For the most part, the U.S. government still 
functions as a five and dime store in an eBay world.” 
But Rumsfeld saw only part of the problem: the asym-
metry was not only because the U.S. government had 
not modernized. It also hadn’t seen the potential for 
asymmetrical, terrifying and sometimes pre-modern 
modes of shifting allegiances and turning weaknesses 
into strengths. 
In some ways much has changed since Rumsfeld’s 
speech, and many governments have sought, not al-
ways successfully, to avoid the shock of surprise that 
leads to crises in communications. The Obama State 
Department, especially under Hillary Clinton, persis-
tently devoted itself to changing the culture of the in-
stitution to remedy the deficit that Rumsfeld pinpoint-
ed. Whiz kids surrounding Secretary Clinton became 
transfixed with the task of transformation—with, for 
example, the creation of what they called a doctrine of 
“21st Century Statecraft” meant partly to obviate ele-
ments of adverse information asymmetry.3 Technical 
updating—becoming more fluent in social media, for 
example—offers a relatively easy area for catching up. 
Far more difficult are those circumstances where the 
asymmetric advantage of a foe comes from their more 
sophisticated understanding of customs engrained in 
the cultures of the societies where allegiances are be-
ing shifted—for example, better knowledge of family 
and educational structure or familiarity with lan-
guage—or where ethical or other similar differences 
lead to the inability of one party to use effective ap-
proaches open to another.  
In analyzing asymmetric contexts, rather than ask 
                                                          
3 See Department of State (2013), and Drezner (2011). The 
ambiguous results of this ongoing effort have been captured 
by critics. For instance, see Morozov (2010).  
who has the most weaponry, one could ask which 
agents have the most sophisticated sense of using the 
information tools they have, including marketing or use 
of social media. This could be sophistication in presen-
tation or insight into potential effect. Rumsfeld (2006), 
in his talk discussed above, suggested asymmetries in 
moral expectations, with the “weaker,” non–state ac-
tor willing to use communicative techniques with lower 
ethical standards. There also may be an “asymmetry of 
patience:” citizens of a Western democracy may tire of 
persisting in a conflict while the asymmetrical oppo-
nent can maintain its slow and dogged approach. Writ-
ing about asymmetrical warfare, Uroš Svete (2009) has 
argued that the “essential point of asymmetry thus lies 
in pursuing…[approaches] that are contrary to realistic 
ideas of the balance of power in the quantita-
tive/conventional sense.” Strategists of communication 
recognize a historical jujitsu, reversing the power con-
text so that the weak appear to become strong, and 
the strong become weak.4 The counter–strategist rec-
ognizes the vulnerabilities that may lead to this kind of 
reversal of fortune. The protestor and his or her sup-
porters internalize the existence of new means to 
break a wall of access; the state and existing authority 
will seek new ways to compensate for the weakness of 
old defenses.  
Participants in a competition for allegiances who 
have been in a position of dominance are often blight-
ed by the illusion of their presumptive power. Conven-
tional international broadcasters may suffer from this 
phenomenon. These dominant players are almost al-
ways faced with the danger of unanticipated openings 
by new entrants: mere shadows on the horizon that 
suddenly loom as potential or real threats. ISIS’ media 
team, otherwise barred from the communications 
landscape, turn to new and viral forms of communica-
tion as they seek to break formal and informal modes 
of control. International broadcasters and those behind 
them may not be well prepared for the consequences 
of asymmetry. They have broader targets, less well de-
fined. They are constrained in their behavior. The im-
pulse, often justified, is to strike out at the asymmetric 
innovators. Much of what occurs in terms of censor-
ship, control and, increasingly, the use of violence, con-
stitutes a blunderbuss of responses of the powerful in 
this paradigm-shifting asymmetric world.  
There have been many examples of technological 
innovations that help to break broadcasting- related 
cartels. Radio stations that broadcast, unlicensed, from 
the sea (so–called pirate ships) caused turmoil in the 
radio sphere of the 1960s. In the 1990s, the brashly 
competitive introduction of satellite technology over 
existing transponders broke the illusion of total control 
over the information space, but even then, for the 
most part, weak players were not able to take ad-
                                                          
4 See McCauley and Moskalenko (2011).  
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vantage of the apertures because of inexperience or 
prohibitive costs or gateway barriers. What is signifi-
cant about ISIS is the replacement of a cartel by a mo-
nopolist, and a ruthless and effective one at that.  
5. Patterns of Reaction 
This then goes to questions of how international 
broadcasters or their governments react. Many mod-
ern debates deal with ways of reacting to the disrup-
tions and asymmetries these technological changes 
have created. Asymmetry is significant, for example, if 
the characteristics of “weakness” result in one player 
being more innovative and responsive than another in 
a way that is destructive of existing institutions. The 
important variable is how these opportunities are 
seized and by whom. In The Cultural Industries, David 
Hesmondhalgh (2007) distinguished (in a very different 
context) between large commercial, corporate bureau-
cracies and small network organizations. Bigger bu-
reaucracies with all their resources and hierarchical 
structures find it hard to move quickly enough to ad-
dress changes in the market, while smaller, more nim-
ble, decentralized network organizations are often 
more successful, especially in early adoption of trends. 
A similar phenomenon is at work in the political con-
text. Of course, large entities may use their scale and 
control to stifle innovation; and some large entities 
(companies and countries) have sought nevertheless to 
maintain an innovative edge.  
International broadcasters, and certainly the gov-
ernments behind them, seek, in a certain sense, to 
“learn” from innovative competitors and adopt their 
techniques. But often this cannot work. What makes an 
asymmetrical competitor effective, as has been stated, 
is the resort to arguments that are not available to a 
conventional broadcaster. The fictive promise of an af-
terlife, cushioned with an abundance of conforming 
sexual partners of an idealized quality, is available to 
the ISIS propagandist, but not to the BBC or the Voice 
of America. There are areas of content differentiation 
which cannot be a zone for comparable access.  
Institutional differences present themselves. If for 
example, the issue is battling the recruitment of young 
Britons for ISIS, the role of the World Service might be 
to help public understanding—around the world. It is 
not the vehicle for retail contestation for hearts and 
minds one at a time. Its focus is not on a domestic au-
dience, even a segment of one. In some states, new en-
tities are shaped to counter the work of the asymmet-
ric entrant. In the US, an entity called the Center for 
Strategic Counter-Terrorism Communication was es-
tablished in the Department of State, but it lacked the 
scale and fervor of its ISIS competitor. The tasks and 
skills required to perform new tasks in a new infor-
mation environment may not be easily nourished in an 
existing environment.  
States’ and other players’ responses to the new in-
formation asymmetries vary across categories. Adapta-
tion to information asymmetry can mean adoption of 
the new or adaptation of the old. In response to the of-
ten stunning and surprising communications innova-
tions by asymmetric opponents, governments—as we 
witness—fluctuate between repression and creative 
response. They extend the ordinary processes of con-
trol to modes and technologies by which the marginal 
or innovatively subversive express themselves. But that 
is often not enough. Harshness may be the initial im-
pulse, but it is often ineffective in staunching the ef-
fects of the repression. Counter-strategies evolve. 
Players in an asymmetric context have had both 
similar and differentiated categories of target audienc-
es. ISIS has demonstrated the significance of potential 
recruits as a heavily analysed and exploited market. 
But usually the targets are populations in the zone of 
conflict (Afghanistan or Egypt of the Arab Spring) and a 
global audience as well. Furthermore, the entity, usual-
ly here the legacy media, may have a home market (the 
domestic audiences of the coalitions of the willing, the 
donor audiences of the NGOs, and so on).5 In all of 
these there are allegiances to shift. Each audience re-
quires a different strategy, and asymmetries have dif-
ferent implications for each audience and each strate-
gy. There is a difference between the use of media, 
even asymmetrically, to persuade generally—to reach 
a large audience to change opinion—as opposed to its 
use to “recruit” a dedicated core of workers or sup-
porters, or those who engage in acts of terror such as 
suicide bombers. And counter-strategies differ depend-
ing on cross–national support for asymmetric efforts.  
6. Who is Weak and Who Is Strong? 
Asymmetry in a strategic communication context gen-
erally features a narrative dimension; stories shift and 
are transformed by the specific asymmetric relation of 
a particular context. Incumbent governments, and their 
broadcasters, may for a time deem themselves (or be 
deemed by others) as categorically powerful even if in 
a particular setting or at particular time they are on the 
verge of becoming weaker and outmaneuvered. The 
putatively weak, often agents of subversion from the 
perspective of the established states, consciously look 
to the margins as modes for entering the market. If 
they gain a foothold, the response of the powerful can 
be one of sharp self-realization and complex reaction.  
The model for asymmetry, then, should capture sit-
uations where a weak player has the potential for up-
ending the status quo. Experts at the asymmetrical 
                                                          
5 Consider Putnam’s well–known two–level game theory, 
where strategic communicators look to both “home” and 
“target” markets even as they engage with the asymmetry 
within the target market citation. 
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seek to protect their capacity to disturb, shielding ac-
tion from the interventions of the established. They 
take risks and endure the possibility of arrest and 
death; they engage in hard to detect personal contact. 
They mask or cover their use of social media. They con-
centrate on the person-to person.  
Strategies of innovation and response depend on 
understanding patterns of information flow. A first look 
at the Arab Spring cases suggests that the reverbera-
tion from street protest to international or regional 
press to Al Jazeera beaming back into Egypt was a for-
mula that wreaked havoc with existing patterns of 
state control over information. And—certainly this was 
the case in Egypt—the major global attention created a 
second relevant audience, one that was meaningful not 
only within the state but also internationally. In the in-
ternational market for loyalties, elements of asym-
metry were almost reversed as weaker entities could 
find points of access more readily than official spokes-
persons. Whatever “cartel” affects large elements of 
the international market, ease of entry for proponents 
of reform, civil society or “change” may be greater in 
over-ripe regimes with aging leaders and increasingly 
unpopular agendas. Looking across the sweep of in-
stances—from Tunisia to Libya—one could seek to de-
termine how the once-weak and asymmetrically posi-
tioned overcame or exploited that status, in what 
markets (domestic elite, domestic popular, interna-
tional officialdom, international public opinion), and 
what combination of external coverage and internal 
growth could be held accountable for change. 
7. How the David and Goliath Metaphor Dissolves 
Weak players have certain tropes that they may push 
to gain sensational and immediate entry to an audi-
ence’s attention. Terrorist acts have this quality. One 
response is to determine ways to neutralize such 
tropes. During the worst days in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the Bush administration sought to deny its enemy, 
comparatively “weak” proponents of powerful imag-
es—such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda—such external 
amplification. This was done, for example, seeking, 
sometimes in vain, the assent of broadcasters not to 
diffuse photographs of dismembered heads or flag-
draped coffins of returning American military.  
In the annals of strategic communication, then, the 
most notable cases will be the ones where seemingly 
disadvantaged asymmetric entrants become strong 
and influential (if not dominant), moving from exclu-
sion or subordinate status to being effective partici-
pants in key markets for loyalties. It is this success that 
becomes the study text for innovative asymmetries 
and for consequent countermeasures. This is not only 
the (possibly temporary) drama of ISIS, but also of the 
isolated, distant Ayatollah, distributing audiocassettes 
in the Shah’s Iran and overwhelming the advantages of 
state control and the sophistications of modern public 
relations (Srebreny & Mohammadi, 1994). Shuddering-
ly threatening to some, but romantic to others, is the 
idea of the excluded becoming the prevailing figure, 
almost as if being an outsider becomes a talisman for 
entry. Some combination of exclusion, striking of a 
sympathetic cord, and a capacity to play the instru-
ments of communication leads to an unexpected tri-
umph. In the aftermath, the world searches for hidden 
signs that elements of asymmetry were a façade—that 
those who appeared weak were heavily financed, that 
there were powerful players in league with the seem-
ingly powerless. Conspiracy theories, not always un-
founded, crop up to shift the characterization of the 
enterprise from one of weak to strong, to one of strong 
to strong, or strong to weak.  
The sympathy is often, though less in the case of 
ISIS, with the seemingly weaker player—the hunger 
striker, the initial protestors, the proto-Gandhis of the 
world. But there is a curious question about the very 
semantics of the asymmetric. Take the ubiquitous Da-
vid and Goliath metaphor, so firmly in our mind—the 
mythically unstoppable, powerful figure attacked by a 
nonentity armed with a seemingly inconsequential 
weapon. In retrospect, that is an illusion. The match is 
asymmetric if the two are fighting in different worlds 
with different rules, different technologies, even dif-
ferent strategic capacities. But as time passes and cir-
cumstances shift, balances may change, and the clash 
is no longer so asymmetric. Innovators use asymme-
tries in the commercial field to bring down media gi-
ants; the frequency and bases for that become the 
stuff of military and political analysis. The lesson has 
been established and the lesson should be learned, 
whether David triumphs because of skill or fortune (or 
divine blessing). Information asymmetries are thus time-
bound, though the learning curve and repair phase could 
be long. Finally, asymmetry fatigue may set in, as the in-
sistent message of a proponent, too steadfastly portray-
ing its David-like status, loses credibility. For these rea-
sons, asymmetries are inherently unstable. 
In the case of ISIS, the metric for success is com-
plex: it is a matter of measuring fear and following 
within the physical area it controls; or the extent to 
which it terrorizes civilian populations around the 
world; or the extent to which it proceeds to gain re-
cruits from a diverse geographical source of target 
groups. In the case of ISIS, as with most asymmetric en-
trants, the question then becomes disturbing the effec-
tiveness of those techniques? One question is whether 
any asymmetric innovator long relies exclusively on its 
own capacity or, rather, must rely on voluntarily or in-
voluntary allies who amplify their messages. For exam-
ple, the anti-Mubarak Tahrir Square protestors, at the 
beginning, fit within the category of the weak against 
the strong. But it was not the technique of protest and 
grassroots mobilization alone that led to the success of 
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the protestors and their emergence as effective asym-
metric actors. It is hard to determine what gave rise to 
the international support for Tahrir Square or to assess 
the exact balance of forces that led to change, but it is 
clear that that additional support was crucial. In terms 
of control of information flows, protestors faced a sub-
stantial fortress—the government of Egypt—yet 
proved extraordinarily successful in an international 
market for the validation of ideas and the obtaining of 
support. Face time on channels in the United States 
and Europe could and did influence coverage in Cairo. 
However they are portrayed, ISIS messages are often 
amplified. 
8. Communication Strategy and Asymmetry: 
Consequences 
Strategies of contemporary wars have been revolution-
ized by thinking about asymmetric conflict.6 Indeed, 
asymmetric warfare studies created a new and dynam-
ic taxonomy for military approaches. The asymmetries 
in battles for hearts and minds can and have led to sim-
ilar transformations. First, there is a transformation in 
attention to technologies of information access. The 
United States was obliged to overhaul its understand-
ing of the relationship between new technologies (in-
cluding social media) and opinion formation. Surveying 
asymmetric movements in the Arab Spring, studying 
the opposition in Iran, and reviewing the building of 
civil society in China, another lesson learned by the 
United States may have been that those who seek to 
support seemingly weak players can best do so by in-
creasing access to information and seeing the uses of 
social media for mobilization increase.  
Battling to maintain primacy in contexts of infor-
mation asymmetry is an ongoing effort for all compet-
ing actors. Certainly, the dissidents of the world use 
current events as a text from which to learn for the fu-
ture. ISIS has been significantly creative, even if dan-
gerously and immorally so, in its information policies. It 
has learned and it has through its learning innovated. 
Those in authority struggle to do so as well, analyzing 
modes of affecting a market for loyalties, seeing how 
apertures are exploited, determining how defenses can 
be buttressed. The main condition for understanding 
asymmetry in information exchanges is that circum-
stances change as participants learn and adjust to pre-
viously exposed weaknesses.  
Perhaps this is the primary lesson in understanding 
information asymmetries: authorities adjust or they 
are doomed (or certainly disadvantaged). Similarly, if 
the “protestors” or destabilizers cannot adjust to 
change, cannot learn sufficiently from prior processes 
of dynamic adjustment, or cannot forge alliances with 
strong players who enable them, they too are rendered 
                                                          
6 See Van Baarda and Verweij (2009).  
less successful. What works in terms of use of media to 
mobilize an internal target audience one day may not 
work the next.  
From the perspective of the state, gaps in techno-
logical development are particularly difficult to sur-
mount. Bureaucracies, particularly sclerotic bureaucra-
cies in authoritarian regimes or bureaucracies that 
have been nepotistic, as opposed to meritocratic, at-
tempt to buy external expertise at high cost and have a 
delayed capacity to respond to the use of new technol-
ogies and social media. What this has meant is that 
there is a new race to learn what was not learned be-
fore, to overcome the deficiencies Rumsfeld noted, to 
eliminate the weakness of social-media tone–deafness. 
It is important to remember the key mantra of asym-
metry: exploit your opponent’s weaknesses, and avoid 
their strengths. The implication is to anticipate weak-
nesses and convert them in advance to strengths. This 
was a central tenet of the Petraeus counter-insurgency 
strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
I have suggested that asymmetry also occurs if one 
side considers itself empowered to use techniques that 
are denied to the other, whether this denial is for ethi-
cal or legal reasons. As a way of evening out the play-
ing field, “adjustments” in these legal and ethical barri-
ers may occur. Consider the United States and its 
rolling, shifting effort to compete in the market of ef-
fective techniques that asymmetry has produced. Prin-
ciples—even constitutional principles—that limit sur-
veillance, hamper eavesdropping or restrain coercion 
are modified so that the capacity to interrupt or moni-
tor flows of information is increased. Governments 
overcome reluctances to subsidize messages, or to co-
opt journalists, if they consider that techniques useful 
to them, or undertaken by their foes, should be enlist-
ed. Perhaps the most notorious example of this pro-
cess is the drone–based killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki and 
Samir Khan, both American citizens who were deeply 
engaged in effective messaging on behalf of Al Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as well as in certain 
acts of terrorism. Khan occupied a unique position as 
editor of the online terrorist magazine, Inspire, said to 
be a vital recruiting tool for AQAP as well an effective 
way of advancing its beliefs in English; it was Inspire 
that was said, later, to be the source of information for 
the Boston Marathon brothers. Conceptual barriers to 
targeting killings of American citizens were effaced; 
though the information–related justifications may not 
have been at the forefront, they were a possible ele-
ment of the decision. The implication is this: where 
barriers exist because of domestic limitations, seeming-
ly hamstringing transnational efforts, those barriers will 
be under pressure, and will sometimes be torn down.  
Similarly, all societies, and particularly democratic 
ones, are at an asymmetrical disadvantage if their ca-
pacity to fashion an effective transnational information 
campaign is hampered by domestic politics and that of 
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their opponents is less restrained. As an example, 
American international broadcasting investments such 
as the Voice of America and Radio Marti could reflect 
foreign relations needs and necessities, but also pres-
sures created by internal domestic politics. Resources 
for international broadcasting may be aimed at Cuba for 
reasons of local political pressure rather than otherwise 
assessed national preferences, and effective diaspora 
groups can hijack the process for their parochial needs.  
Table 1 may assist in understanding. This chart 
seeks to demonstrate certain of the distinctions dis-
cussed in this essay as between asymmetric entrants 
more traditional communications entities, including in-
ternational broadcasters. This is hardly a complete dis-
cussion of differences; it is stylized to emphasize dis-
tinctions. 
Table 1. Distinction between asymmetric innovators 
and legacy broadcasters. 
 Purpose Medium Narrative 
Message 
Constraint 
Asymmetric 
Innovator 
Short term 
mobilization 
Internet, 
Personal 
influence 
Urgency Few 
Legacy 
Broadcaster 
Longer term 
shift or rein-
forcement 
Broadcast-
ing, Satel-
lite 
Present  
or future 
Stability 
Many 
A curious and important asymmetry—relevant to stra-
tegic communication—involves the different capacity 
of the government and dissenters to control whether 
individuals in society can sense the changing political 
mood of the community. It is one thing for individual 
citizens to wish a change in government. It is another if 
these same individuals are aware that their views are 
widely or pervasively held—an awareness that could 
eventually lead to efforts for change. By controlling in-
formation, the state has been traditionally in a position 
to reinforce a view of what the public generally be-
lieves, even if that is inconsistent with rampant private 
beliefs. In this sense, Elihu Katz (1981) has linked 
asymmetric strategies to concepts of “pluralistic igno-
rance” and the “spiral of silence.” Pluralistic ignorance, 
a term introduced by Floyd H. Allport in 1931, de-
scribes “a situation where a majority of group mem-
bers privately reject a norm, but assume (incorrectly) 
that most others accept it” (Katz, Allport, & Jenness, 
1931). The spiral of silence, a concept developed by 
Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman, asserts that a person is less 
likely to voice an opinion on a topic if he or she feels in 
the minority and therefore is in fear of reprisal or isola-
tion from the society. Situations of asymmetric com-
munication usually involve efforts by the state to main-
tain pluralistic ignorance and spirals of silence, and by 
agents of change to reduce or end them. ISIS creates its 
own silos to encourage shifting loyalties among re-
cruitable youth.  
Finally, an emerging area of information asym-
metry—increasingly related to governance and the 
power of the state—is cyberwarfare and cyberterror-
ism. This is not information asymmetry of the kind most 
discussed in this chapter (asymmetry in access to mar-
kets of allegiances). It is rather the use of innovative (if 
immoral and illegal) approaches to hampering or disa-
bling the capacity of states to function by attacking their 
infrastructure. Destructive hacking may be the action of 
individuals demonstrating their prowess, or it may be in 
the service of other states, their militaries or organized 
groups. Cyberwarfare raises the ethical and moral ques-
tions often raised in asymmetric conflict, including the 
very permissibility of the tool in conflict. It emphasizes 
the innovative, and as such, has the quality of rapidly 
changing circumstances of strength and weakness.7 
What is emerging is a context of new technological 
and institutional arrangements where responses to 
asymmetries yield ever greater unpredictability. 
Asymmetries have always existed. But new media 
technologies, coupled with aggressive use of them by 
increasingly sophisticated players (those invoking the 
power of the protesting streets to the hackers of 
Anonymous and WikiLeaks), upend traditional ar-
rangements and traditional doctrines. An increase in 
information asymmetry leads to weakened confidence 
in the existing institutions and accommodations. In this 
environment, understanding the dynamics of interplay 
between entrants and existing cartels of communica-
tion becomes more and more urgent. 
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